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introductions and eliminations, this characteristic is removed in LK; and when he agrees that (v E) and (3E) are somewhat artificial insofar as (v E) does not bring out the fact that it is only after the enunciation of q v w that we distinguish the cases Q, and W; similarly for (SE). Actually Gentzen claims that what is somewhat artificial is the tree form formulation of (vE) and (3E). But, since he does not seem to be willing to give up the tree form of derivations, his remark may be understood as a criticism of (vE) and (3E) outright.
Commenting on the above defects, Prawitz [19, p. 44 , footnote 21 agrees that treating classical logic only as a special case of intuitionistic logic is perhaps not the most natural way of analysing classical inferences.
One may therefore consider modifying NK, and one natural modification is to make the system more symmetrical with respect to disjunction and existential quantification, as in the multiple conclusion natural deduction system of Kneale [13] . While this suggestion does not seem to have been taken over by Prawitz in later papers (see e.g.
[20, pp. 244, 245]), his criticism largely agrees with Gentzen's view.
What is in question, however, is not so much naturalness as manageability: because of the above mentioned defects of NK, many standard classical laws have non-transparent indirect proofs in NK. By manageability we mean here ease in proof search and in proof checking, not the number of symbols or of proof linesa rather crude complexity measure which seems to be relevant only in limit cases, not in the standard cases of actual logical practice.
In [2] a sequent natural deduction system was introduced which does not present the above mentioned defects of NK. In that system classical inferences are analysed per se, independently of the intuitionistic ones. Similarly to BoriEiC [l] , the system is intermediate between NK and LK: like in NK certain assumptions are made which may subsequently be discharged, and like in LK the inference rules involve finite sequences of formulas instead of single formulas. Differently from BoriEiE [l] , however, the system includes an existential instantiation rule, in order both to avoid the above mentioned defects and to allow simpler proofs. The rules of universal generalization and existential instantiation are subject to restrictions of a kind similar to those of Quine [21] , allowing greater freedom of operation than the restrictions of the corresponding rules (VI) and (3E) of NK. Criticizing systems including a form of existential instantiation, Lemmon [16] put forward the curious argument that classically valid but intuitionistically invalid sentences such as 3y (3x q,(x)-+ q(y)) ought to be hard to prove classically, but the argument seems to be unwarranted. Indeed all basic classical laws listed in Kalish et al. [9] have comparatively simple proofs in the system of [2] . However, just because of the liberality of the restrictions on the rules of universal generalization and existential instantiation, there are some problems in establishing a normalization theorem for the system of [2] . In view of this, in the present paper we introduce an alternative sequent natural deduction system NC,, of a kind similar to that of [2] but with more stringent restrictions on the rules. A peculiar feature of NC, is that it involves restrictions on the discharge rules, like in the intuitionistic natural deduction systems of Smirnov [22; 231 and Leivant [15] , or in the classical natural deduction systems of Kalish et al. [9] , Belnap and Klenk [12] or Fine [4] . The statement of the new restrictions is made easier by introducing a variant of the e-terms.
While less liberal than those of [2] , the new restrictions allow to formulate reductions in terms of which a normalization theorem for NC, can be easily established, using a procedure similar to that of Prawitz [19] . Since the new restrictions allow less freedom of operation, NC, is not as manageable as the system of [2] , but because of its other features it is more manageable than NK. A further advantage of NC, over NK consists in the wider scope of the normalization theorem for it. While, as shown by Prawitz [19] , a normalization theorem can be easily established for a suitable variant C of NK, the corresponding normal form is a weak one: it does not satisfy the subformula property-except in the weak form of Prawitz [19, p. 42 ]-nor the separation property.
On the other hand the normal form involved in the normalization theorem for NC, satisfies both properties, which allows to establish a version of the midsequent theorem and of Herbrand's theorem for NC,. On that account one may question the (widespread) view that, while natural deduction may be useful when one wants a quick treatment, for a fully rigorous and complete treatment sequent calculus LK must be preferred (see e.g. Thomason [24]). NC, seems to be a good candidate for replacing not only NK (or rather, Prawitz's variant C), but also LK in proof-theoretical investigations.
The systems NC and NC,

Languages
The languages considered are first-order languages including both individual and function parameters. (ii) if f is an n-ary function constant and tl, . . . , t, are terms, then fh * * . , tn) is a term; (iii) if P is an n-ary predicate constant and tl, . . . , t, are terms, then P(t1, . . . , t,) is an atomic formula and a formula (in particular, if P is a 0-ary predicate constant, then P is an atomic formula and a formula);
(iv) if q and I# are formulas, then lq, (rp A r+!~), (rp v rj~) and ((p + I/J) are formulas;
(v) if q(a) is a formula containing at least one occurrence of a, a is an individual parameter not occurring in any s-term in q(a) and x is an individual variable not occurring in q(a), then Vx (p(x) and 3x C&X) are formulas, where q(x) is an expression obtained from q(a) by replacing at least one occurrence of a byx; (vi) if E is a function parameter and (p is a formula of the form 3x q(x), then E[Q)] is a term and an s-term.
1.1.4. Notation. We use t, u, v, . . . to denote terms, E, <, q, . . . to denote s-terms (in addition to function parameters), q, I$, x, . . . to denote formulas. (ii) A formula is quantifier-free if it contains no occurrence of the symbols V, 3; a formula contains quantifiers if it is not quantifier-free.
1.1.8. Notation. For any expression p, u, r we denote by p[g the result of replacing every occurrence of o in p by t, including occurrences in e-terms.
1.1.9. Definition. The subformulas of a formula Q, are defined inductively as follows:
(i) Q, is a subformula of q; (ii) if 'I/J is a subformula of q, then so is q1;
is a subformula of q, then so are I/J and 2; (iv) if Vx q(x) or 3x rjj( x ) is a subformula of cp, then so is q[:] for each term t. In what follows, however, we will not be concerned with the interpretation of sequents except as an intuitive guide to our understanding of the inference rules.
1.1.14. Notation. The notation p[a of 1.1.8 extends also to sequents in the obvious way.
Definition.
A term t, a formula Q, or a sequent A is said to be e-free if it contains no c-terms.
Inference rules and derivations
The inference rules consist of structural rules and logical rules. The structural rules include weakening (W), contraction (C) and permutation (P). The logical rules include both propositional rules and quantifier rules. (ii) In a (W) inference the formula cp is called the weakening formula of that inference.
In a (C) inference the formula Q, is called the contraction formula. In a (P) inference the formulas Q, and q are called the permutation formulas.
(iii) In an inference obtained by an I-rule the formula in the conclusion containing the logical symbol introduced is called the principal formula of that inference, while the formulas in the premisses from which the principal formula is built up are called the auxiliary formulas. [Note that in a (11) inference there are no auxiliary formulas.] (iv) In an inference obtained by an E-rule the formula in the premiss containing the logical symbol eliminated is called the principal formula of that inference and the premiss in which it appears is called the major premiss. The other premiss (if any) is called the minor premiss. The formulas in the conclusion or in the minor premiss from which the principal formula is built up are called the auxiliary formulas. [ (i) every topmost sequent, which is called an assumption of the derivation, consists of an arbitrary formula;
(ii) every non-topmost sequent is yielded from the sequents standing immediately above it by an inference obtained by one of the rules of 1.2.1, subject to certain restrictions to be stated below (see Section 1.3);
(iii) the downmost sequent is called the conclusion of the derivation.
1.2.4. Notation. We use 9, 8, 9, 3, . . . to denote derivations.
Definition. (i) (*I), (11) and (3E)
. f m erences allow assumptions of the form indicated within square brackets to be discharged. Discharge is not compulsory: any number of assumptions of the given form (possibly zero) may be discharged.
(ii) A sequent A in a derivation 9 is said to depend on the assumptions standing above A in 9 which have not been discharged by some (+I), (11) or (3E) inference standing above A in 9.
(iii) The open assumptions of a derivation 9 are the assumptions on which the conclusion of 9 depends. 
Restrictions on parameters and presuppositions
The inference rules (+I), (lI), (VI), (YE) and (3E,) are subject to certain restrictions.
1.3.1. Definition. (i) In a (VI) or (3E) inference the individual parameter a is said to be the proper parameter of that inference.
(ii) An individual parameter a is said to be a proper parameter of a derivation 9 if it is the proper parameter of some (VI) or (3E) inference. (i) In a (VI) . f m erence the proper parameter a must not occur in the conclusion of that inference or in any assumption on which the conclusion depends.
(ii) In an (3E) inference the proper parameter c1 must not occur in the major premiss, in the minor premiss or in any assumption on which the minor premiss depends except in the assumptions &a) discharged by that inference.
1.3.3. Definition. Let NC be the system whose inference rules are those of 1.2.1 except (3E,), subject to restrictions 1.3.2, where the rules are confined to c-free sequents (i.e., derivations in NC may contain only s-free sequents).
1.3.4. Remark. NC is essentially the system of Boricic [l] except that in the latter (VI) is split into two inference rules: (ii) An E-term E is said to be a proper e-term of a derivation 9 if it is the proper s-term of some (3E,) inference in 9.
1.3.7. Definition. We say that an e-term in a derivation 9 presupposes an assumption Q, if E is the proper E-term of an (3E,) inference whose premiss depends on q.
1.3.8. Definition. The inference rules (+I) and (11) are subject to the following restrictions on discharge :
(i) In an (+I) inference any c-term occurring in the principal formula q+ '1' or in an assumption on which the conclusion A, q+ r+~ depends must not presuppose q.
(ii) In a (11) inference any c-term occurring in the principal formula TQ, or in an assumption on which the conclusion A, 1~) depends must not presuppose 9~.
1.3.9. Definition. We say that a subderivation Sa, of a derivation 9 introduces an s-term E in $S if is a subderivation of 5?J where E = E[~X q(x)] is the proper E-term of the indicated (3E,) inference. (ii) Let NC: be the system whose inference rules are those of 1.2.1 (including both (3E) and (YE,)), subject to restrictions 1.3.2, 1.3.8 and 1.3.10.
1.3.W. Remark. NC, and NC: are presuppositional systems in the sense of Fine [4] . The idea of a presuppositional system is implicit in the intuitionistic systems of Smirnov [22; 231 and Leivant [15] ( see also Mints [17] for an alternative approach), and in the classical systems of Montague and Kalish [18] (see also Kalish et al. [9] ), Belnap and Klenk [12] and Fine [4] . is not a derivation in NC, or NC: because the principal formula 3x Px+ PE of the indicated (+I) inference contains an c-term E that presupposes the discharged assumption 3x Px. In NC, and NC: only the following more complicated derivation is available: (i) the proper parameter of a (VI) inference in 9 occurs only in sequents standing above the conclusion of that inference;
(ii) the proper parameter of an (3E) inference in 9 occurs only in sequents standing above the minor premks of that inference;
(iii) each proper parameter of 9 is the proper parameter of a single (VI) or (3E) inference.
Proof. Similarly to Prawitz [19, p. 
Relations between NC and NC,
Idle parameters and e-terms
In order to establish the results in the next section it is convenient to eliminate individual parameters and E-terms playing no essential role in a derivation.
2.1.1. Definition. Let 9 be a derivation in NC, NC, or NC:, and let a be an individual parameter and E an E-term occurring in 9.
(i) We say that a is idle in 9 if a is not a proper parameter of 9. (ii) We say that E is idle in 9 if E is not a proper s-term of 9.
Definition.
Let 5B be a derivation in NC, or NC:, and let E be an c-term occurring in 9. Then let:
the set of all assumptions presupposed by E in 9, pra(E) = if E is a proper E-term of 9, 0, otherwise. 
Soundness of NC, relative to NC
The soundness of NC, relative to NC in the syntactical sense can be established by converting derivations in NC, into derivations in NC. Proof. Using 2.1.5 we may assume that no c-term occurring in 9 is idle in 9. The proof is by induction on the number p of proper c-terms occurring in 9. If p = 0, then the result is trivial because then 9 is a derivation in NC outright. If p = q + 1, then let E = E[~X r&x)] be a proper c-term of 9. By 1.3.10, 9 has the form:
where all the conclusions of (3E,) inferences with proper s-term E are those indicated in square brackets.
Let A be the uppermost sequent standing below [A, V(E)] such that E does not occur in A or in any assumption on which A depends. [Such a A must exist because 9 is pure.] Thus 9 is actually of the form: We want to show that Bdl is a derivation in NC: whose open assumptions are among those of 9 and with the same conclusion as 9. It suffices to note the following facts.
(1) By 1.3.10, E is idle in 4, hence by 2.1.4(i) it can be seen that the tree ending with the minor premiss of the indicated (BE) inference is a derivation in NC:. [By the choice of A, E does not occur in A or in any assumption on which A depends in 9.1 (2) The indicated (BE) inference satisfies 1.3.2(ii). For, by the choice of a, a does not occur in the major premiss. Since E does not occur in A, a does not occur in the minor premiss. Since E does not occur in any assumption on which A depends in 9, a does not occur in any assumption on which the minor premiss of the indicated (BE) inference depends in 9,, except 3x q(x)* ~(a).
(3) Since, by the choice of A, sequents in 9, standing below A, Q)(E) either contain E or depend on assumptions containing E, by 1.3.8 no assumption in r may be discharged below A, Q)(E) in 9,. Therefore all discharges in 9 remain correct in 9J.
Since obviously the number of proper e-terms in 9, is ~4, by the induction hypothesis 9, can be transformed into a derivation 9' in NC whose open assumptions are among those of 9, and with the same conclusion as 9,. This yields the result. 0 2.2.3. Remark. Our proof of 2.2.2 is similar to one of Leivant [15] (for a different system). The proof of Leivant [15] does not immediately extend to NC: because of the (different) form of our rule (BE).
Corollary (Soundness theorem).
Every pure derivation 9 in NC, can be transformed into u derivation 9' in NC whose open assumptions are among those of 9 and with the same conclusion us 9. To establish this let gi, . . . , 9" (where n 2 2) be all subderivations of 9 introducing the same c-term E in 9. Choose i, 1 <i 6 IZ, such that for no i, 1 G i G n, i #i, 5$ is a subderivation of sjai. Replace every giai, 1 G i G IZ, i #i, in 9 by 5?Jj. Clearly, by repeatedly applying this procedure for every c-term introduced in 9, we obtain a derivation 9 with the desired property.
Note, however, that ?J and 9' are only loosely related, 9' being obtained from 9 replacing subderivations by others which are only extensionally equivalent to them.
Completeness of NC, relative to NC
The completeness of NC, relative to NC in the syntactical sense can be established by converting derivations in NC into derivations in NC,.
2.3.1. Theorem. Every pure derivation 9 in NC: can be transformed into a pure derivation 9' in NC, whose open assumptions are among those of 9 and with the same conclusion as 9.
Proof. By induction on the number p of (3E) inferences in 9. If p = 0, then the result is trivial because 9 is a pure derivation in NC, outright.
If p = q + 1, then take an (3E) inference in 9 such that no other (BE) inference in $?J stands above its major premiss. Using this fact we may conclude that the assumptions on which A, A depends in 97r are in r U 0, hence they are among those on which the conclusion of (3E) depends in 9. Therefore ga, is a derivation in NC: whose open assumptions are among those of 9 and with the same conclusion as 9.
By the choice of (3E), the number of (3E) inferences in ?& is q, hence by the induction hypothesis Bdl can be transformed into a derivation 9' in NC, whose open assumptions are among those of ga, and with the same conclusion as sa,. This yields the result. Proof. By 2.3.1 together with the fact that every derivation in NC is a pure derivation in NC:. 0 2.3.3. Remark. Since, by BoriEiC [l] , NC is complete, 2.3.2 establishes not only the completeness of NC, relative to NC in the syntactical sense, but also the completeness of NC, outright.
Normalization in NC and NC,
cuts
In a derivation an inference obtained by (W) or by an I-rule, whose weakening formula or, respectively, principal formula is also the principal formula of an inference obtained by an E-rule standing below that inference, is an unnecessary detour. For historical reasons, such detours are called cuts.
3.1.1. Remark. In order to simplify the proofs of the results below we consider an inessential variant NC-of NC. The variant is based on a device introduced by Kleene [IO; 11, p. 2901 which allows to drop the inference rule (P). The device is embodied in the following definition.
3.1.2. Definition. We modify the inference rules of 1.2.1 by assuming that the order of listing of formulas within sequents is to be immaterial in applying the rules.
3.1.3. Definition. Let NC-be the system whose inference rules are those of 1.2.1 except (P) and (3E,), modified as indicated in 3.1.2 and subject to the restrictions 1.3.2, where the rules are confined to e-free sequents. 3.1.6. Definition. A cut in a derivation 9 (in any of the systems considered in this paper) is a sequence 2 = A,, . . . , A, of sequents in 5B such that there is a formula q~, called its cut formula, satisfying the following conditions:
(i) Q, is a member of each Ai, 1 s i =S n;
(ii) AI is the conclusion of a non-atomic (W) inference whose weakening formula is rp, or of an inference obtained by an I-rule whose principal formula is V;
(iii) each Ai, 1 S i <n, is a premiss of an inference, whose conclusion is Ai+,; (iv) A,, is the major premiss of an inference obtained by an E-rule, whose principal formula is 'p. 
Remark.
In accordance with 1.3.18, we assume that the result of applying one of these transformations is a derivation satisfying the proper parameter condition, if necessary by an application of 1.3.16.
Normalization
Applying the reductions of Section 3.2 in an appropriate way one can eliminate all cuts from any derivation in NC-or NC and from any pure derivation in NC,.
Theorem (Normalization theorem for NC-).
Every derivation 9 in NCcan be transformed into a normal derivation 6%' in NC-whose open assumptions
are among those of 9 and with the same conclusion as 53.
Proof. By the degree of a derivation
we mean the maximum degree of its cuts or 0 if the derivation is normal. By the index of a derivation we mean the number of cuts of maximum degree within the derivation or 0 if the derivation is normal.
The order of a derivation is defined as the pair (d, i) where d is the degree and i is the index of the derivation. Then we choose a cut in 9, of degree d such that no cut of degree d occurs above it in 9,, and which is also such that the inference of which the last sequent in the cut is the major premiss does not have as a minor premiss a sequent which belongs to or stands below another cut of degree d.
Because inferences obtained by E-rules have been moved up as far as possible in 9,, the chosen cut has length 1. However, the result holds if we confine ourselves to pure derivations, as shown by the following result.
3.3.5. Theorem (Normalization theorem for NC,). Every pure derivation 9 in NC, can be transformed into a normal derivation 9' in NC, whose open assumptions are among those of 9 and with the same conclusion as 9.
Proof. By 2.2.4, 9 can be transformed into a derivation 9, in NC whose open assumptions are among those of 9 and with the same conclusion as 9. By 3.3.2, LSa, can be transformed into a normal derivation 9; in NC whose open assumptions are among those of 9i and with the same conclusion as 9,. By 2.3.2, 9~; can be transformed into a derivation 9' in NC, whose open assumptions are among those of 9; and with the same conclusion as 9i;. By inspection of the proof of 2.3.2 it appears that, since 9d; is normal, such is 9'. This yields the result. 0 4. The structure of normal derivations of NC,
The form of tracks
A pure normal derivation in NC, has a special structure: the assumptions, or weakening formulas, or principal formulas of (11) inferences, are broken down in their components by use of the E-rules, and the final components thus obtained are then put together by use of the I-rules. To state this structure in a more precise way we introduce some notions. (i) if p is one of the two occurrences of the contraction formula in the premiss of a (C) inference, then the occurrence of the contraction formula in the conclusion is a successor of p;
(ii) if p is an occurrence of a permutation formula in the premiss of a (P) inference, then the occurrence of the permutation formula in the conclusion is a successor of p;
(iii) if p is an auxiliary formula in a premiss of an inference obtained by an I-rule, then the principal formula in the conclusion is a successor of p; (iv) if p is the principal formula in the major premiss of an inference obtained by an E-rule, then an auxiliary formula in the conclusion is a successor of p; (v) if p is the nth formula of A (respectively, A) in a premiss of an inference obtained by any rule, then the nth formula of A (respectively, A) in the conclusion is a successor of p.
Definition.
A track of a derivation 9 is a sequence Z = q,, . . . , tpn of formulas such that:
(i) q1 is an assumption, or a weakening formula, or the principal formula of a (11) inference;
(ii) qi+i for 1 C i < n is a successor of vi; (iii) 97, is either: (a) the auxiliary formula in the minor premiss of an (+E) or (1E) inference, or (b) the principal formula of a (1E) inference, or (c) a formula belonging to the conclusion of 9, whatever of the conditions (a)-(c) applies first.
If cp, satisfies condition (iii)(c), then .Z is said to be an end track of 9. (2) The derivation:
52)
P_,-nP (l) contains three tracks consisting respectively of: (i) the formulas -P,
P--,-nP;
(ii) the formula P; (iii) the formula 1P. (ii) We say that a segment is a weakening formula if the first formula of the segment is a weakening formula.
(iii) We say that a segment is the principal formula of an inference obtained by an I-rule if the first formula of the segment is the principal formula of that inference. We say that a segment is an auxiliary formula of an inference obtained by an I-rule if the last formula of the segment is an auxiliary formula of that inference.
(iv) We say that a segment is the principal formula of an inference obtained by an E-rule if the last formula of the segment is the principal formula of that inference. We say that a segment is an auxiliary formula in the minor premiss of an inference obtained by an E-rule if the last formula of the segment is dn auxiliary formula in the minor premiss of that inference; an auxiliary formula in the conclusion if the first formula of the segment is an auxiliary formula in the conclusion of that inference. Proof. First we show that in 2 each segment that is the principal formula of an inference obtained by an E-rule precedes each segment that is an auxiliary formula of an inference obtained by an I-rule. Suppose not. Then in Z there is a first segment which is the principal formula of an inference obtained by an E-rule and succeeds a segment which is the principal formula of an inference obtained by an I-rule, and such a segment is a cut segment. This contradicts the hypothesis that 53 is normal. Now, let ui be the first segment in _Z that is an auxiliary formula of an inference obtained by an I-rule or, if there is no such segment, let ui = a,,. Then clearly ai satisfies (i) and (ii). By what has been proved every segment Uj such that i <j, for j #n, is an auxiliary formula of an inference obtained by an I-rule, hence (iii) is satisfied. This concludes the proof. 0
The subformula property
From the detailed description of the form of tracks of pure normal derivations of NC, we may conclude that each formula occurring in such a derivation is a subformula of an open assumption or of a formula in the conclusion. This can be established as follows.
Definition.
We assign an order to every track .X = vi, . . . , Q?,, of a pure normal derivation 9 as follows:
(i) if 97, occurs in the conclusion of 9, then .Z is of order 0; (ii) if Q),, is the auxiliary formula in the minor premiss of an (+E) or (1E) inference and the principal formula in the major premiss of that inference belongs to a track of order p, then Z is of order p + 1.
(iii) if Q)~ is the principal formula of a (YE) inference, then ,Z is of order 0 whenever q1 is an open assumption of 9, while _Z is of order p + 1 whenever 9, is an assumption discharged in 9 by an (-I) or (11) inference whose principal formula belongs to a track of order p.
Remark.
If Z'= ql, . . . , tpn is a track of a pure normal derivation and q,, is the principal formula of a (1E) inference, then v, cannot be a weakening formula or the principal formula of a (11) inference, hence q1 must be an assumption. This motivates 4.2.l(iii). Proof. Let 9 be a pure normal derivation in NC, with open assumptions r and conclusion A. We assume that the result holds for all segments of a track of order <p and show that it holds also for all segments of a track of order p. Let .Z be a track of 9 of order p, let cr,, . . . , CJ, be the sequence of segments in _X and let cri be the minimum segment of 2.
First we show that the result holds for a,,. If a, occurs in A, then the result is clear. If a, is the auxiliary formula in the minor premiss of an (-+E) or (1E) inference, then a,, is a subformula of the principal formula in the major premiss and the latter belongs to a path of order p -1, hence the result holds for a, by hypothesis. If o,, is the principal formula of a (1E) inference, then by 4.1.10, u1 is an assumption and a,, is a subformula of o,. If o, is in r, then the result holds for a,,. If g1 is discharged by an (+I) or (11) inference, then o, is a subformula of the principal formula of that inference which belongs to a track of order p -1, so the result holds for o1 by hypothesis, and hence it holds for a,. Since the result holds for a,, by 4.1.10 it holds for all oj with i <j < n.
Next we show that the result holds for ol. If o1 is in r, then the result is clear. If o1 is an assumption discharged by an (+I) or (11) inference, then or is a subformula of the principal formula of that inference which belongs either (1) to the I-part of 2, or (2) to a track of order <p. In case (l), the result holds for ui by what we have already established for Oj with i <j s n. In case (2), it holds by hypothesis. If ur is a weakening formula or the principal formula of a (11) inference, then, since 9 is normal, o1 cannot belong to the E-part of _Z:, hence o1 is either the minimum segment or belongs to the I-part of Z. In both cases the result holds for u1 by what we have already established for a, with i <j s n. Then by 4.1.10 the result holds for all aj with j =S i. This concludes the proof. Pure normal derivations in NC, with no open assumptions, whose conclusion is a sequent consisting of prenex formulas only, can be uniformly transformed into pure normal derivations with no open assumptions and with the same conclusion, having an even more transparent structure. The transformation consists essentially in the permutation of certain inferences.
Definition. (i) A prenex
formula is a formula of the form Q,x, . * * Qp, I/+~, . . . , x,) where n 2 0, each Qi is an occurrence of V or 3, and the quasi-formula $~(xi, . . . , x,) is quantifier-free.
(ii) An existential formula is a prenex formula Qrx, . . * Q,x, ~(x,, . . . , x,) where each Qi is an occurrence of 3. Proof. If ur is a weakening formula or the principal formula of a (11) inference, then ui = ai since 9 is normal, hence (i) holds vacuously. If u1 is an assumption, then u1 must have been discharged in 9 by an (*I) or (11) inference whose conclusion is of the form q+x or iv respectively, where r/.~ is the formula of o,. By 4.2.4, q-x or lrj~ is a subformula of a formula in A and hence must be quantifier-free. Thus I/J and hence o, must be quantifier-free.
Therefore, by 4.1.10, condition (i) holds.
If a,, is in A, then the first half of (ii)(b) holds. If oi is quantifier-free, then the second half of (ii)(b) holds. If o1 is not quantifier-free, then by the above argument o1 cannot be an assumption, and by 4.2.4, cri cannot be the principal formula of a (11) inference, so o1 must be a weakening formula, hence the second half of (ii)(b) holds. If a,, is an auxiliary formula in the minor premiss of an (+E) or (1E) inference, then the principal formula of that inference is of the form q+x or 13 respectively, where 3 is the formula of a,. By 4.2.4, q+= x or ~IJJ is a subformula of a formula in A and hence must be quantifier-free. Thus $I and hence a,, must be quantifier-free. Then, by 4.1.10, ai and every oj in the I-part of ,Y must be quantifier-free, hence (ii)(a) holds. If CJ, is the principal formula of a (1E) inference, then the formula of a,, is of the form 1~. By 4.2.4, 1~ is a subformula of a formula in A and hence must be quantifier-free. Thus a,, must be quantifier-free. Then, by 4.1.10, a, and every oi in the I-part of _Z must be quantifier-free, hence (ii)(a) holds. We modify 9 as follows. Let bi, . . . , b, be new individual parameters not occurring in 9 and let ui, . . . , u;_~ be the result of replacing every occurrence of xi, . . . , n, by bi, . . . , b, in u,, . . . , Ui--l, respectively. We replace the conclusion of rl by the sequent A, I+(u;, . . . , u:_~, bi, . . . , b,), so that rl is transformed into a (W) inference whose weakening formula is quantifier-free.
Then we add a number of (VI) or (31) Let m(9) be the total number of pairs (11, 6) such that r] is a (VI) or (31) . f m erence and I? is a propositional inference standing (not necessarily immediately)
below r] in 9. Similarly, let n(9) be the total number of pairs (q, 6) such that 7 is a (VI) or (31) inference and 6 is a (W) inference standing (not necessarily immediately) below 77 in 9. The proof is by induction on the pair (m(g), n(g)), h w ere all such pairs are supposed to be ordered lexicographically. Case 1: m(9) = 0 and n(9) = 0. Then all propositional and (W) inferences stand in 9 above all (VI) and (31) In order to show the permutability of 71 and 6 we must distinguish a number of cases. For illustration we consider the case where q is a (VI) inference and 19 is an (+I) inference. Then 9 is of the form:
Without loss of generality we may assume that the inferences intermediate between q and 6 do not include any (C) inference whose contraction formula is Vxx(x). [For, such a (C) inference can be always moved below 6, because 6 already contains Vx x(x) as a side formula, and all inference rules are such that, if an inference contains a given side formula, it remains a correct inference if any number of repetitions of that side formula is added.] Then let LB1 be the derivation: ct> Every (VI), (31), (P) or (C) inference p can be permuted with a (W) inference Y standing immediately below it (i.e., such that the conclusion of the former is the premiss of the latter).
For, using (t), 6 can be moved up until q and 6 are permuted, yielding a new derivation 9i such that m(9&) = 0 and n(9J = n(9) -1. The result then follows by applying the induction hypothesis to 94.
It remains to establish (7) . For illustration we consider two cases. If ~1 is a (VI) inference, then the given derivation is of the form:
The permutation is performed as follows:
[Note that the restriction on proper parameters 1.3.2(i) is satisfied by the indicated (VI) inference because of our assumption 1.3.18.1 If ~1 is a (C) inference, then the given derivation is of the form:
The permutation is performed as follows: (iii) every inference standing below 0 in 9' is a (VI), (31), (C) or (P) inference.
Proof. By 4.3.4 and 4.3.6, 9 can be transformed into a pure normal derivation 9 ' with no open assumptions and with the same conclusion as 9, in which all weakening formulas are quantifier-free and all propositional and (W) inferences stand above all (VI) or (31) inferences. Let 0 be the premiss of the topmost (VI) or (31) inference in 9' (if any); otherwise, let 0 be the conclusion of 9'. By 4.3.3 the only formulas containing quantifiers occurring in 0 or above 0 would be weakening formulas. Since all weakening formulas in 9' are quantifier-free, it follows that 0 must be quantifier-free. 0
Uniformity results
The more transparent structure provided by the midsequent theorem has a number of interesting applications. In this section we discuss two such applications, showing that pure normal derivations in NC, with no open assumptions, whose conclusion is a sequent consisting of prenex sentences only, can be transformed into pure normal derivations with no open assumptions, whose conclusion is a sequent consisting of quantifier free sentences only.
Convention.
In this section we assume that the language considered contains at least one individual constant, say k,. Proof. By 4.3.7, 9 can be transformed into a pure normal derivation 9, with no open assumptions and conclusion A and with midsequent O1. Every formula in Oi is of the form rJ~(ui, . . . , ui), for some existential sentence 3x* * * * 3X" +(x1, . . . 3 x,) in A and some terms u',, . . . , uf,, because all inferences intervening between Oi and the conclusion A are (II), (C) or (P) inferences. Let %i be the part of 9, ending with 0,. If 0, contains individual parameters or c-terms, replace all such individual parameters or s-terms in 8i by the individual constant kI (see 2.1.5). Thus 8, is transformed into a tree of sequents $$ which is still a derivation because 8, contains inferences obtained by propositional and structural rules only. If we put 9' = &, then clearly 9' has the desired properties. Proof. By 4.3.7, 9 can be transformed into a pure normal derivation gdl with no open assumptions and with conclusion A, whose midsequent is a quantifier-free sequent Or. We modify '& by the following procedure.
Starting from the conclusion and moving up, for every (VI) inference n we proceed as follows. Let A, Qixi * * . Qnx, x(x,, . . . , x,) be the conclusion of n (SO that Qi is an occurrence of V), and let ~1= Qlxl . * * Qnx, +(x1, . . . , x,) be the prenex sentence in A belonging to the same end track as QiXi * * * Qn~n X(xi, * . . 7 x,) (so that the latter is a subformula of q). We replace each occurrence of the proper parameter a of n by: (i) k, if Qrxr.. * Qi-rXi_r contains no occurrence of 3, where k is the individual constant associated with Qi in 9;
(ii) f (ui,, . . . , Ui,), if Qi,, . . . , Q, are all occurrences of 3 in Qrx, . . . Qi-rxi-r, where f is the function constant associated with Qi in Q, and 
